The Eritrean Gulag - 1

Sudanese Sightings in Eritrean’s Prisons

"The truth is always reclaimed, while life may be buried forever."

                                            Razumikhin,

                                            Crime and Punishment by Dostoevsky

 This is merely a narrative of what happened—of observations and accounts that my conscience compels me to convey. I don’t intend here to narrate the reasons behind my one-month-long imprisonment in an underground prison by Eritrean intelligence—nor the abuse and desperate attempts to break and subdue me—except to the extent that allows me to reflect on the suffering I witnessed among Eritrean citizens. Perhaps this account will also lead me to discuss the relationship between the Sudanese and Eritrean peoples and my personal evaluation of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) regime in Eritrea, especially in its relations with Sudan and its political organizations.

Wednesday, March 31, 2004

 Why Is the Eritrean Intelligence Looking for Me?

 I informed by my colleagues at the media office of the opposition coalition “NDA” in Asmara that members of the Eritrean intelligence, led by someone from the Border Guard office named Berhane, were looking for me. I went to the executive office of the coalition, and the same thing was happening: “But they couldn’t find you!!!” said the office director. I happened to be walking down the street to the Sudan Social Welfare Organization “Amal”, and again I heard the same news. They just hadn’t asked about me at the guesthouse where Abd Al-Aziz Khalid, the head of the executive office of “Sudan national Alliance/Sudan Alliance Forces” SAF, was staying, where I was almost always present, contributing with my colleagues to resolving the crisis engulfing SAF—what was termed an "organizational crisis"—brought on by crooked methods of pursuing "legitimate ambitions," which were tainted with self-interest, opportunism, and the lack of both personal and objective qualifications among those who took on leadership roles in the attempted coup against a legacy and history, brief as it was, that had shaped major events in Sudanese politics.

This coup attempt, which ended in resounding failure, was directly and shamelessly supported by the Eritrean state, which is controlled by the PFDJ. Eritrea provided all its political, media, financial, military, and security resources to facilitate this coup.

But why was Eritrean intelligence looking for me? The question wasn’t so much surprising as it was absurd, especially since those who positioned themselves as my enemies were unaware of my capabilities and only acted after it was too late. The PFDJ’s actions were nothing more than a delayed reaction. Was it because I played a key role in obstructing their plan targeting SAF by constantly exposing the conspirators after I resigned from my position as head of the Culture and Media Secretariat in SAF? Or because I mentioned in one of my articles the PFDJ’s involvement in what was happening to SAF? I don’t know... But I found myself imprisoned on April 1, 2004, for thirty days, sentenced to hard labor in an underground prison on Eritrea’s western border, after a long journey in a Mercedes truck from Asmara. I was now considered a threat to Eritrea’s national security because I said “no” to Eritrean interference in SAF’s affairs. I was accused of spying on the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) for the Sudanese embassy in Asmara, along with other charges repeatedly echoed by the PFDJ’s mouthpieces through their Sudanese-born representatives.

What Dr. Taysir Mohamed Ali, who was then head of the political department of SAF and before that the head of foreign relations, didn’t know, blinded by his opportunism along with those who supported him, is that the conspiracy to destroy SAF—by sowing discord—didn’t begin when Eritrean political leadership lured him to play the role of “Brutus” during the second preliminary conference in July 2001. Rather, it began when the PFDJ, which controls the reins of power in Eritrea, had to pay the price for the support it had received from certain quarters during its war with Ethiopia. Part of this price was targeting SAF and working to neutralize its influence. Although these quarters brazenly presented their demands to Eritrean leadership, they didn’t fully understand SAF, its strengths, or its weaknesses. Fortunately for SAF, its political backbone was located far from Eritrea’s center of power, with only a symbolic presence in the executive office.

But why was SAF being targeted? It didn’t matter to those quarters whether it was SAF or any other entity. They didn’t care about understanding SAF up close or from afar. What mattered was that, in the context of Sudan’s internal political conflicts, they decided to align with a powerful ally within Sudanese politics, one who saw SAF as a looming threat that would force it to reconsider its strategies—something this ally didn’t want, at least not at that moment. And so they pressured the Eritrean political apparatus to launch a war against SAF. The common belief was that SAF was merely an Eritrean creation that could be dismantled at will, especially since SAF’s military forces, which played a significant role in the armed struggle in Sudan’s eastern front, could be easily subdued by Eritrean forces if necessary. The Eritrean political apparatus had to respond to this request, with the echoes of Ethiopian artillery still reverberating through Eritrea, and the ruling PFDJ regime still facing existential threats.

The quickest solution for the PFDJ and its security apparatus was to revive an old rumour from 2000, one that had died in its infancy. This rumour claimed that SAF’s leader was spying for Ethiopia and that SAF’s forces stationed in northern Blue Nile were merely a cover for smuggling information from Eritrea to Ethiopia. But even this wasn’t enough in 2001, so they needed to supplement it with internal organizational issues within SAF.

Dr. Taysir Mohamed Ahmed swallowed the bait (and others had to swallow it with him to support his future project). The plan aligned with his personal ambitions, and his dreams seemed within reach—he would assume leadership without much effort. He began executing the drawn-up plan without understanding its background or consequences, or the trap he was walking into (unknowingly, he had no idea of the predicament he was in). He became just another scapegoat onto which the People's Front (PFDJ) could hang its political miscalculations in its future relations with the Sudanese people and their political organizations.

This was the penultimate scene before the practical steps began (as we all know, there was much debate both within and outside SAF about unity with the SPLM and the organizational crisis before this moment). It was time for the final blow, as they say in boxing, or the moment of zero-hour, in military terms.

The historic meeting took place on February 18, 2004, which included PFDJ Secretary-General Amin Mohamed Said and General Teklai Mengistu on one side, and members of SAF's executive office present in Asmara (Abd Al-Aziz Khalid, Kamal Ismail, Ali Yaseen, Taysir Mohamed Ahmed, Anwar Adham, and Mohamed Abdelmonem). The presence of the last two members in Asmara had been arranged to witness the political demise of SAF's executive leader, and to install Dr. Taysir as the temporary leader of SAF until it could be dissolved under his leadership. However, the final blow missed, taking down with it some of the PFDJ’s highest political figures.

But why did Eritrean intelligence target us after their political leaders’ plan failed? A working group had been cooperating to fully expose the plan and deal with it.

Despite the sluggishness of the Eritrean intelligence services, they had embedded agents within SAF, sparing them the need for extensive effort; these insiders eagerly provided the information the intelligence wanted, and even information they didn’t. The PFDJ offices had practically become extensions of the intelligence service itself. However, they missed one crucial piece of information: certain individuals were aware of the PFDJ’s plans, by pure coincidence, not because SAF had any advanced detection capabilities.

After the first indications of what the PFDJ was planning before SAF’s second conference in 2001, we had to respond collectively and track the plan through the actions of Dr. Taysir. Known for his impatience and rashness, he quickly revealed his next move—and perhaps even the one after—without waiting to see the outcome of his initial steps. He exposed all his cards before the second conference ended, positioning himself as the best alternative for the post-Abd Al-Aziz Khalid era, claiming Khalid’s role was “finished.” However, things did not go as planned after Abd Al-Aziz unexpectedly returned from a trip to the USA, despite their wager that he wouldn’t make it back. Our collective efforts succeeded in building solid resistance, particularly after Dr. Taysir became confident in his ability to recruit supporters whenever he wished. I had to play the role of the blind man, agreeing to his nomination of me to the post of Secretary of Culture and Media (he didn’t trust the previous secretary, who would stand in the way of his ambitions).

The idea of unification with the SPLM was politically compatible with SAF's vision. After SAF leaders met with an SPLM delegation led by Commander James Wani Igga in September 2001, it was clear both sides wanted to pursue the alliance, though they disagreed on the mechanisms for achieving it. After SPLM leader Dr. John Garang and Abd Al-Aziz Khalid signed the unity agreement on February 28, 2002, on clear terms, the PFDJ leaders were caught off guard, and contradictions arose in their stance on this strategic step. This happened especially as Sudanese peace talks gained momentum in Machakos and later Naivasha—something the Eritrean regime didn’t want (they had bet on the failure of peace talks between the Sudanese government and the SPLM). But what could they do about Dr. Taysir, who was now eagerly eyeing his seat in the SPLM’s leadership and a future ministerial post?

In a scene reminiscent of Richard in James Joyce’s Exiles, as he gazes at Bertha and speaks as if to an absent person: "You have wounded my soul with a deep doubt that will never heal. I can never know in this world. I have no wish to know or to believe. I am not interested in certainty, but in the sharp and ever-renewed doubt that never settles. To possess you without bonds, not even the bonds of love, to unite with you in soul and body in a complete and total bond—this is what I desired and longed for. And now I am a little tired, Bertha. My wound is tiring me."

So, the PFDJ needed to adjust their plans to serve their next tactical move in handling the Sudanese peace process. For now, they would settle for taking down Abd Al-Aziz Khalid. By removing him, they could more easily steer SAF under Taysir’s leadership. But what was their next tactic? General Teklai Mengistu (speaking for the group of five that runs the Eritrean state—President Isaias, Amin Mohamed Said, Abdullah Jaber, Yemane Gebreab, and General Teklai Mengistu) and Colonel Sarnay of the Eritrean Border Guards agreed that unity between SAF and the SPLM was not a priority for them at the moment. They believed SAF needed to regain its strength after successfully removing Abd Al-Aziz Khalid and installing Taysir Mohamed Ahmed in his place. The unity project was no longer useful since Sudanese peace was becoming a reality. They needed to keep some opposition factions against the Khartoum regime as leverage to destabilize the peace process.

This quick overview is important to explain why I ended up in an Eritrean intelligence prison, before I delve into the suffering I witnessed among Eritrean citizens in the PFDJ’s prisons