The Eritrean Gulag 4

 April 5, 2004

Someone once told me a political joke about the Eritrean president, Isaias Afwerki. The story goes that the People's Front for Democracy and Justice, after being overwhelmed by the large-scale escape of Eritrean citizens across the borders to neighboring countries, decided to open the doors of migration without restrictions. When the regime announced this, the Eritrean Department of Passports and Immigration became crowded with long queues of citizens, and standing at the back of the line was none other than President Isaias Afwerki himself. As soon as someone behind him noticed him, Afwerki quickly left the queue. This kept happening until the president found himself alone at the immigration desk within a short time. The president asked the officer: “Why did all those people back out of proceeding with their travel arrangements?” The officer responded: “Your Excellency, if you’re migrating out of the country, why would the rest of the citizens stay?”

The Eritrean Gulag 3

 April 3, 2004

No food or water since early morning, and the Mercedes truck sped down the dirt road as its load lightened a bit. The guards were a little more relaxed with the group of deportees, allowing some to stand for a few minutes to get more comfortable. But the scorching heat of the Eritrean lowlands intensified the burning of the metal surface we were sitting on. The temperature difference between the highlands and the lowlands was stark, though Eritrea’s population is almost evenly split between the two regions. Eritreans are divided into about nine ethnic groups, with the Rashida tribe recently added to the list (including the Tigre, Tigrinya, Bilen, Afar, Saho, Kunama, Sahorta, and Nara). However, the ruling Popular Front refused to recognize the Jeberti as a distinct ethnic group, which many say is for political reasons. These groups are either Muslim or Christian, but a new faith has emerged since independence: the "Popular Front" itself.

My companions on the truck (even the guards and their commander) were from these various ethnic and religious backgrounds. Those who once believed in the Popular Front were either disillusioned, wavering, or had renounced their faith after over thirteen years of rule, except for the few elites who still benefited.

The Sudanese Army: Military Doctrine and the Absence of the State 4-4

 By Ameer Babiker Abdalla Saad

It was only natural that Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s coup against the Constitutional Document would succeed. He removed the other party from the political scene by force, annulled parts of the "Constitutional Document" that didn’t align with his ambitions, and retained those that didn’t affect the broader picture, keeping a semblance of cooperation with the regional and international actors who pressured for its approval. It was natural for this to succeed because the state was already primed for it, given its deliberate absence—just as all previous coups that overthrew democratic regimes had succeeded.

Here, I reiterate a point I often make: coups led by the military always succeed in toppling democratic regimes, but military coups fail to overthrow regimes governed by the military. These military regimes are usually overthrown by popular mass uprisings.

The Sudanese Army: Military Doctrine and the Absence of the State (3)

 By Ameer Babiker Abdulla Saad

Under what military doctrine has the Sudanese Armed Forces operated since the overthrow of the al-Ingaz regime?

Since independence, the military doctrine of the Sudanese Armed Forces has found itself caught in the midst of chaos at the state level, with no comprehensive national doctrine. The military entered the post-independence era with its colonial heritage and its history of military operations linked to the comprehensive doctrine of the colonial state, which was rooted in expansion and domination. The Sudanese Armed Forces fought alongside the colonial army in various battlefronts, including with the Allied forces during World War II against the Axis powers.

The Sudanese Army: Military Doctrine and the Absence of the State (Part 2)

 By Ameer Babiker Abdalla Saad

The emergence of the Sudanese "state" into the stage of independence as an inevitable reality, without a comprehensive doctrine, led to consequences, the most striking of which was the first rebellion in 1955, on the eve of the declaration of independence. It concluded with the secession of the South and the establishment of an independent State.

When using the term "doctrine," the mind immediately jumps to something sacred, religious, or ideological, which often causes confusion and muddles the Sudanese scene at all levels—political, social, military, economic, and intellectual—essentially encompassing what constitutes the comprehensive doctrine of the state.

The Sudanese Army: Military Doctrine and the Absence of a Unified State (1)

Ameer Saad

 The State and Comprehensive Doctrine

 Despite the bleakness of the ongoing war, which has lasted almost a year and a half, plunging the country into a dark tunnel and creating catastrophic consequences, it has shed light on critical political, social, and military issues that have long been sidelined or ignored during the journey of establishing a national state.

 One of the most significant and comprehensive issues that this war has highlighted is the profound flaw in the concepts and hierarchy of the states comprehensive doctrine and the military doctrine of the national army. A key cause of this flaw is the continuous war that has plagued the country since the eve of independence and the dominance of military rule for more than 60 years since independence. Even during the brief periods of what is known as the "First, Second, and Third Democracies," the impact of war and its repercussions continued to affect their progress.

The Eritrean Gulag 2

 Sudanese Sightings in Eritrean’s Prisons

April 1st, 2004...

 At exactly 10 a.m., I found myself inside the headquarters of the Border Guards in Asmara, in the office of a man named Girmay Mezgegna, who held the rank of major in the Eritrean army and was the director of the office of General Tekle Mengistu.

At the same time, he was responsible for issuing travel and residence permits to Sudanese opposition members in Eritrea. Ironically, this man—with all his arrogance, pride, and overblown self-importance—had become the go-to authority on everything related to the Sudanese opposition in Asmara, coordinating with a man named Ibrahim Idris, director of the office of Amin Mohammed Saeed, the secretary-general of the People's Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ).

This, in my opinion, represents the height of absurdity and mockery of the Sudanese opposition. It’s also the peak of self-disrespect for the opposition to allow people like these to manage their affairs and be considered advisors on complex issues such as the Sudanese cause.